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Abstract 
Devolution provides large scope for Scotland to make its own policy. Primary legislation 
is one measure of this. Scottish legislation before devolution tended to replicate measures 
for the rest of the UK, with differences of style. Scottish legislation in the first four-year 
term of the Parliament shows a big increase in output. There is an autonomous sphere, in 
which Scotland has gone its own way without reference to the rest of the UK. In other 
areas, there is evidence of joint or parallel policy making, with Scottish legislation 
meeting the same goals by different means. Finally there is a sphere in which Scottish 
legislation is essentially the same as that in England and Wales. Sewel motions have not 
been used to impose policy uniformity on Scotland. There is evidence that devolution has 
shifted influence both vertically, between the UK and Scottish levels, and horizontally, 
within a Scottish legislative system that has been opened up.  
 
Policy, devolution and legislation 
A key test of the devolution settlement in the United Kingdom is the ability of the 
devolved institutions to make policy autonomously and, where they wish, to deviate from 
the line pursued at Westminster. Policy, however, is a notoriously difficult concept to 
operationalize and measure. Assessing the policy output of an institution can go all the 
way from looking at general statements of intent to measuring the impact of specific 
measures on social and economic conditions. In this article we focus specifically on the 
primary legislative output of the Scottish Parliament during its first term (1999-2003), 
comparing it with that of Westminster. 
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   The central question is whether devolution has made a difference and permitted 
Scotland to go its own way. It is complicated by the fact that, unlike other cases of 
devolution, Scotland has always had its own legal system, with its separate laws, albeit 
passed by the central parliament at Westminster. Scotland also had its own executive 
institutions in the form of the Scottish Office, run by a Secretary of State with a 
substantial bureaucracy in Edinburgh, although these also remained an integral part of the 
central state government.  There are varying interpretations of these old mechanisms for 
governing Scotland.
2
  Kellas saw them as evidence of a distinct Scottish political system 
within the British system.
3
 Paterson discerned a pattern of Scottish autonomy based on 
internal accommodation, although this was stronger at some times than at others and was 
much reduced by the 1990s.
4
 Others have tended to see the Scottish arrangements as a 
way of putting a Scottish face on British policy, and concerned with the details of how 
things were done rather than what was done.
5
 This is the view to which we adhere. There 
were occasional innovations like the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and education did 
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have its own rather distinct policy community. There was a great deal of policy work and 
legislation on housing but this tended to follow the main lines of British party policy at 
any given time. Local government reform was handled separately in Scotland but reforms 
tended to follow those in England. 
   Indeed in some fields, Scottish deviations from England were usually due less to the 
strength of Scottish institutions than to their weakness. Governments are usually hindered 
more by divisions on their own side than by the Opposition. The weakness of 
Conservatism in Scotland, including in local government, weakened this factor under the 
Heath, Thatcher and Major governments, allowing unfettered executive dominance. This 
allowed for the more radical local government reforms of 1975 and 1996 compared with 
England.  Scottish MPs did carve out their own niche at Westminster, but this was within 
the boundaries of the British party system and involved modifying the details of policy or 
lobbying for Scottish material interests rather than forging a distinct policy line.
6
  
   If this analysis is correct, then devolution does have the capacity to make a difference 
across two dimensions. Firstly, the Scottish level is more autonomous from London 
government. Secondly, Scottish interests that could not penetrate the old system of 
administrative devolution may be better represented, so shifting influence within 
Scotland.  Scotland’s new legislative process, with more consultation, and the enhanced 
role of committees 
7
may allow changes in proposals during their passage. Traditional 
forms of Scottish distinctiveness on form (the 'how') will remain, but there may be more 
divergence on substance (the 'what'). On the other hand, there are considerable constraints 
on policy divergence in practice. 
8
 Some are contextual, like the existence of a common 
British market, a common security area and a welfare state. There are interdependencies 
between devolved and reserved matters and some devolved matters are highly 
Europeanized. In many fields, there are common British interest groups and policy 
communities.
9
 Finally there is the partisan dimension; the first Scottish legislature has 
been dominated by a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition not far removed politically from 
the government in London.  
 
 
The Division of Powers 
The Scotland Act, 1998, provides for a reasonably clear division of powers between 
Westminster and the Scottish Parliament by listing only the powers reserved to the centre 
and leaving everything else in the devolved sphere. Powers which are devolved 
correspond rather closely to the matters that were previously handled by the Scottish 
Office, many of which were subject to Scottish legislation. There are, however, some 
overlaps and interlinked areas, particularly in economic development policy, at the 
interface between the social security system (reserved) and other forms of social 
intervention including housing, training and social work, and in criminal justice. While 
the Scottish Parliament is subject to the ultra vires rule and laws going beyond its powers 
may be struck down by the courts, no such restriction applies to Westminster, which 
retains the right to legislate in devolved areas. A convention has been established, 
however, that Westminster will legislate on devolved matters only with the consent of the 
Scottish Parliament in the form of a 'Sewel motion'. This has proved contentious. 
. 
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General Patterns 
One immediate finding is that the quantity of Scottish legislation increased greatly after 
devolution. Under the old regime, there was little time for Scottish legislation, although 
the provisions to take second readings in the Scottish Grand Committee had freed up 
some time. Between 1979 and 1999 there was an average of six Scottish Acts approved at 
Westminster per parliamentary session (although there were exceptions for example in 
1980 when seventeen were enacted). In the first term of the Scottish Parliament, this had 
increased to an average of sixteen Acts per session. Some of these involved housekeeping 
matters for which parliamentary time could not be found before, while others, like the 
Land Reform Act, were major policy items that had long featured in Scottish political 
debate.  
   We can make some overall generalisations from reading Holyrood and Westminster 
bills together. The Scottish Parliament has taken more care over gender-neutral language 
and tends to make more reference to consultation procedures. Scottish legislation tends to 
give more scope to local authorities while Westminster is in the habit of requiring them to 
draw up specific policy plans as a condition of funding. There is also more of a tendency 
for Holyrood, through the Subordinate Legislation Committee or the committee 
processing the bill, to amend bills so as to require committee scrutiny and parliamentary 
approval for statutory instruments.
10
   
   Joined-up government appears to be more of a reality in Scotland than in Westminster, 
with White Papers and legislation keener to draw links between the immediate focus and 
other policy sectors.  For instance, links to health and education issues, which go beyond 
the most simplistic, are raised in the Transport (Scotland) Act 2001 and Regulation of 
Care Act 2001.  In addition, social inclusion appears to have been 'mainstreamed' to a 
greater extent in Holyrood legislation than in Westminster legislation, with policies in all 
areas giving consideration to this issue.  All this is consistent with the declared intention 
of the devolved institution to do politics differently, although it may be a matter of style 
rather than substance. The tendency to give more scope to local government is consistent 
with other findings that the Scottish Executive has tended to defer to the strong local 
government interest within the Labour Party and that relations have not been particularly 
conflictual.
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  The one obvious exception is where the Ethical Standards in Public Life 
etc. (Scotland) Act 2000 provides that the code of conduct for councillors will be 
determined at national level, where the Local Government Act 2000 enacted at 
Westminster allows some scope for local adaptation and autonomy, within the parameters 
set by a model code. 
 
Analysing Legislative Output 
The analysis is limited to primary legislation, although we realise that secondary 
legislation, administrative devolution and ministerial discretion also influence policy 
convergence and divergence. Although we have not explored the effects of this, we have 
sought to indicate areas in which there is scope for further divergence at the secondary 
level. Accordingly, we have constructed a typology of legislation, going from bills with 
no counterpart in the other jurisdiction to those that are more or less identical. In between 
are the categories of bills that deal with the same issue but a different policy and those 
that deal with the same issue and the same policy. These intermediate categories are 
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particularly difficult to analyse, since it is often the details of administrative provision or 
the scope for statutory instruments and ministerial discretion that will determine whether 
they really are different. We have therefore pulled out in the analysis the bills that seem to 
provide such scope. This gives us the following categories. 
 
 Holyrood legislation with no Westminster counterpart 
 
 Westminster Acts with no Holyrood counterpart. We have a separate category 
here for Sewel motions. 
 
 Legislation that deals with the same issue but with a different policy. This 
includes similar legislation with significant differences in detail.  
 
 Legislation that deals with the same issue and with the same policy, but with 
scope for differences in application. 
 
 Legislation that is essentially the same but passed separately 
 
Assigning legislation to individual categories is often a matter of judgement, and the third 
category in particular merges into the previous one and the next one respectively. Further 
complications arise from the fact that Acts tend to deal with a bundle of issues in the 
same policy sector but the particular bundles dealt with in Acts in the two jurisdictions 
were not necessarily identical.
12
 So we have sometimes categorised individual parts of 
Acts differently, as well categorising them as wholes. To clarify the purpose and meaning 
of legislation, we have also looked at White Papers, although these do not always lead to 
a single Act, but to two or three Acts.  For instance, proposals in the DETR's Modernising 
Social Services White Paper were legislated for both in the Protection of Children Act 
1999 and in the Care Services Act 2000.  We have also noted substantive policy shifts 
between the White Paper and legislation ultimately enacted, no doubt following interest 
group pressure in the two jurisdictions. This was particularly interesting in Holyrood 
legislation, when White Papers had been published prior to devolution and the Acts 
passed after it, with shifts in policy showing the greater weight of distinct Scottish 
interests. The final complication arises from the use of Sewel motions and we have done 
an analysis of these, to see whether they are being used as an instrument of policy 
uniformity.  
 
Holyrood legislation with no Westminster counterpart 
We have included thirty eight Acts of the Scottish Parliament in this category. Five deal 
with public finance: the four annual Budget Acts, plus the Public Finance and 
Accountability Act 2000. There are also two acts (plus part of another) that ensure 
Scotland's compliance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights. In fact the Mental Health (Public Safety and Appeals) Act 1999 was the first piece 
of legislation enacted by the Scottish Parliament and was an emergency measure 
following a highly publicised court case involving an inmate of Carstairs hospital.  This 
Act, as well as the Adults With Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (addressing advocacy and 
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rights issues), served as temporary measures during the completion of the Millan 
Report.
13
 The subsequent Mental Health (Scotland) Act 2003 was a comprehensive 
reform of compulsory care and treatment. 
   The Standards in Scotland's Schools etc Act 2000 and the School Education 
(Amendment) Act 2002 continue the pre-devolution tradition for Scotland to handle its 
own education policy, although the former has some overlap with Westminster legislation 
(see below). Scotland has remained committed to comprehensive education and against 
opting out of local authority control.  
   Also included within this category is the highly publicised and politically contentious 
Education (Graduate Endowments and Student Support) Act 2001, for which there is no 
counterpart in Westminster. The decision to abolish up-front tuition fees and provide 
some student grant support in Scottish universities is a clear break with English policy, 
although the Scottish example was one factor in leading the UK government to propose 
reintroducing some support in its 2003 White Paper for England.  The White Paper’s 
proposals for top-up fees, however, represent a further divergence from Scottish policy.
14
  
   A further five pieces of Scottish legislation highlight the distinct legislative path in 
Scotland since devolution, although this sometimes represents convergence with, and 
some divergence from, English practice. The Land Reform Act introduces possibilities for 
collective land purchase that have no counterpart elsewhere in the United Kingdom. 
While in the past Scottish land legislation was passed at Westminster (land reform is an 
historic aspiration of the Labour and Liberal parties), nothing as extensive as the current 
Scottish legislation would have found its way onto the Westminster timetable. The 
Abolition of Feudal Tenure (Scotland) Act 2000 (and its successor, the Title Conditions 
(Scotland) Act 2003) was a consensual matter long pending. It arguably brings Scotland 
closer to England, showing that devolution is not just about divergence. The National 
Parks (Scotland) Act 2000 also implies convergence with England, which has had 
national parks since the post-war era, when landowner opposition delayed their 
introduction in Scotland. These latter three Acts highlight the shift in power within 
Scotland, undermining interests previously sheltered under the old Westminster 
dispensation.  
    The Abolition of Poindings and Warrant Sales Act 2001 ends a distinctively Scottish 
practice, which was widely seen as archaic. Finally, the Protection of Wild Mammals Act 
2002 bans hunting with dogs in Scotland. There is no English and Welsh Act due to 
opposition in the House of Lords but the Bill for England and Wales introduced in 2002 
differs significantly in its approach to the issue.  
   Criminal justice is an area in which Scotland has its own policy community of lawyers, 
police officers and academics, although there are strong cross-border influences.  The 
division of responsibilities is also such as to make the field particularly entangled. So 
Scotland has its own Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 but elements of this follow or 
prefigure English practices. It was directed against sexual offences and trafficking for 
prostitution, introduced drug courts and, in its original version, restricted the ability of 
parents to administer corporal punishment, which would have meant a significant policy 
divergence from England and Wales. The absolute ban on physical punishment of 
children under three was removed after parliamentary and media opposition. 
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Amendments to provision for non-custodial sentences followed precedents set in 
England.  
   There are also several Acts that fit into this category that deal essentially with 
housekeeping matters and general tidying up that would never have found their way onto 
the busy Westminster timetable. 
 
Westminster Acts with no Holyrood Counterpart 
One hundred and forty four Westminster Acts have no Holyrood counterpart although 
twenty eight of these involve Sewel motions where they encroach on devolved matters. 
Most of these Acts deal with reserved matters and do not concern us here.  Thirty six of 
them do not apply to Scotland, of which eight are for Northern Ireland and one is for 
Wales.  The remainder are England or England and Wales Acts. In addition, there are six 
Acts that are almost entirely for England and Wales but with some limited Scottish 
application. Six Acts focusing essentially on criminal justice in England and Wales do not 
have Holyrood counterparts, and reflect the high place of these questions on the Labour 
government's agenda at Westminster. Three of these have some Scottish application, 
showing the entanglement of devolved and non-devolved matters. The Criminal Justice 
and Court Services Act 2000 applies mostly to England and Wales but some provisions 
are UK wide: Schedule 5 which amends the Sex Offenders Act 1997; the disclosure by the 
Secretary of State of driver licensing records; certain provisions relating to the abolition 
of detention in a Young Offender Institution; and custody for life, and the sections on 
courts-martial. People disqualified in England and Wales from working with children will 
also be disqualified from working in Northern Ireland but the extension of this to 
Scotland was left to Holyrood in the Protection of Children (Scotland) Act 2003 (see 
below). Courts-martial have jurisdiction across the United Kingdom and this is reflected 
in the provisions relating to them.    
   The Health Act 1999 applies to Great Britain and implements Labour policies on health 
service reorganisation. It has no Scottish Parliament counterpart because it originated 
before devolution. The Terrorism Act 2000 is UK wide in its application since action on 
terrorism is a reserved matter. The division of competences here seems a little unclear, 
since terrorism is presumably defined by the motive of the perpetrator rather than the 
nature of the deed. It updates existing counter-terrorist legislation (Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) 
Act 1996 and sections 1-4 of the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998). 
The Anti Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which includes devolved matters, was 
also adopted on a UK wide basis, with the Scottish Parliament opting into parts of it 
through a Sewel motion.  
   There is no evidence that Westminster is using its residual power to legislate in 
devolved matters at will, or seeking to override the Scottish Parliament.  Rather the bills 
in this category are mostly related to reserved matters, England and Wales matters, and 
Northern Ireland matters. Sewel motions have been employed in matters that straddle 
devolved and non-devolved issues. 
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UK Legislation with Sewel Motions 
Sewel motions represent a particular category of UK legislation since this trespasses on 
devolved matters and implies that the Scottish Parliament has surrendered the right to 
make its own policy. Critics have charged that the number of Sewel motions 
15
 breaches  
undertakings  that they would be exceptional, and that Holyrood is surrendering its 
responsibilities. 
16
 More careful analysis, however, reveals a greater complexity. Some 
Sewel motions stem from convenience, the idea that if Scotland is going to pursue the 
same policy it need not waste its own legislative time. A good example of this was 
provided above in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, 2001, an emergency 
measure that a Holyrood Bill would largely duplicate.  As Deputy Justice Minister Iain 
Gray argued, a Sewel motion is quicker and more efficient, and it allows the Scottish 
Executive to legislate selectively.  The motive was: 
 
… essentially pragmatic. We do not think it acceptable to delay these matters until the 
introduction of the Criminal Justice Bill [in Scotland] next year, and we do not think 
that emergency legislation of our own is appropriate for proposals that are unlikely to 
differ on either side of the border. It is right to move quickly and, as far as possible, on 
a common UK front.
17
 
  
This does not mean that Holyrood is surrendering all policy discretion, however, since it 
can opt out of selected parts of the legislation and bring in its own bill. On the anti-
terrorism example, the Executive chose not to follow Westminster in three significant 
issues.  While international corruption provisions are excluded because of Scotland's 
distinct rules of evidence and procedure, the other two opt-outs - relating to policies on 
racial hatred, as well as new police powers to remove disguises - are policy differences.  
As Ian Gray explained: 
 
We will pursue a distinctive approach on religious hatred. I shall chair a 
Ministerial Working Group with cross-party representation and a remit to 
report by the end of February. The Deputy First Minister has already written 
to invite the Commission for Racial Equality and ACPO(S) to participate.  
We may invite others to participate and will, of course, consult widely if we 
have decided not to extend to Scotland the new police powers to remove face 
coverings.  The police feel that the benefits would be marginal and largely 
outweighed by the risk of inflaming already sensitive situations.
18
 
 
   A second reason for Sewel motions is to ensure uniformity, and to avoid loopholes, 
especially in law and order and regulatory matters where the distinction between 
devolved and reserved matters is not clear. Here there is the prospect of 'regulatory 
arbitrage' as individuals could exploit differences between the two jurisdictions.
19
  There 
could in some cases be challenges to the constitutionality of Scottish legislation, where it 
seemed to be at the boundary between devolved and non-devolved matters, creating a 
legislative vacuum. The case of the International Criminal Court is a prime example of 
the need to avoid loopholes.  Whilst both Westminster and Holyrood dealt with similar 
bills and with similar wording, still there was a Sewel motion because the competence of 
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the Scottish Parliament to legislate on this matter is open to interpretation (for example, 
powers of arrest are devolved, but extradition is reserved).  The Sewel motion removes 
doubt by asking Westminster to legislate on the areas with blurred distinctions of 
responsibility.  This looks like a precautionary, pragmatic measure, rather than an 
instance of political interference. 
   Similarly, in the case of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bills, Jim Wallace 
argued: 
 
 We have been keen to ensure that there are no gaps between the two regimes 
that could be exploited by those responsible for serious crime, because there 
is blurred responsibility when the bills require police and law enforcement 
agency cooperation within Britain.
20
  
 
   The same can be said of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.  The Sewel motion is again 
required because some areas - drug trafficking, money laundering and taxation - are 
reserved, whilst other civil and criminal matters are devolved.  Jim Wallace argues that 
the motion reduces the risk of loopholes arising through the separate processes of 
legislation, since the bill aims to  
 
put drug trafficking and other crimes on to an all-crimes basis. 
Comprehensive UK legislation will therefore prove more effective and avoid 
the risk of inadvertent safe havens on either side of the border.
21
 
 
   This concern to avoid loopholes and possible challenges to the constitutionality of 
legislation means that Sewel motions have been used in criminal and security matters 
even where Scotland has chosen to legislate separately, as we show below. In these cases, 
the motions cover matters where there may be some doubt as to whether they are 
devolved.  
   Critics have suggested that another reason for using a Sewel motion may be political 
cowardice, where the Scottish Executive wishes to hide behind Westminster or avoid a 
public or parliamentary debate. This might be one reason for letting Westminster pass the 
Sexual Offences Amendment Act after the controversy in Scotland over Section 28/2A.
22
 
On the other hand, the Scottish Parliament showed more determination over Section 
28/2A than had Westminster, and against more strongly mobilised opposition. In fact, 
there was a technical reason for letting Westminster regulate here, which is that the 
original bill was introduced before devolution, in the 1998/9 Westminster session, but 
defeated in the Lords.  The government then proposed to use the Parliament Act to ensure 
its passage if this was repeated when it was reintroduced.  However, this could not be 
done if the Scottish (or any) provisions were modified before its introduction, since the 
bill must be identical to the one originally introduced. There is no other evidence that the 
Scottish Executive or Parliament are getting Westminster to do their unpopular or 
awkward legislation for them. 
   Some Sewel motions are introduced not so much to surrender the prerogatives of the 
Scottish Parliament as to safeguard them, by making the point that the matter in question 
is indeed in the devolved realm and could be dealt with by subsequent Scottish laws. For 
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example, a motion accompanied plans contained in the NHS Reform and Health Care 
Professions Act because, whilst the health care regulatory bodies come under reserved 
matters, the Scottish Executive could introduce a new regulatory body which would then 
come under devolved control.  Since no such body existed at the time, the Sewel process 
could be seen as staking out Holyrood’s territory rather than infringing it. 
   Finally, Sewel motions are used for a variety of administrative reasons, particularly 
concerning UK regulatory bodies or cross-border matters. The Police Reform Act 
involved a Sewel motion to allow Scottish police officers to be seconded to the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission (for England and Wales).  The Sewel 
motion allows a consequential amendment to the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 to safeguard 
Scottish officers' terms and conditions of service whilst on secondment.  Further, as Jim 
Wallace argues, ‘Technically, that is a devolved matter, but it is part and parcel of wider 
proposals that are not devolved’.23 
   The Care Standards Act involved a Sewel motion to abolish the Central Council for 
Education and Training in Social Work as part of a move to Scottish regulation.  Since 
the Westminster bill was at a more advanced stage than the Regulation of Care (Scotland) 
Bill, the opportunity was taken to use it. The Electronic Communications Act does not 
cover any devolved issues.  Rather, it includes provisions for Scottish Ministers to use 
statutory instruments, rather than primary legislation, to introduce equivalent electronic 
commerce measures in Scotland, despite this being a reserved matter.  
Legislating on banning tobacco advertising followed a rather confusing track. 
Originally there was to have been UK legislation, and the requisite Sewel motion was 
passed. This UK bill fell because of the dissolution of Parliament in 2001. This seemed to 
point to a flaw in the Sewel process, that the Scottish Parliament cannot guarantee that a 
policy it has endorsed will indeed be carried through at Westminster. Consequently, 
Nicola Sturgeon (SNP) introduced a separate Scottish Member’s Bill. This, although 
debated in the Scottish Parliament through 2002, was in turn withdrawn at the beginning 
of December 2002, and single UK legislation enacted with the Sewel motion, the 
Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act 2002.  Malcolm Chisholm, Deputy Minister for 
Health and Community Care at the time, explained to the Scottish Parliament in January 
2001 that some technical and legal issues might be difficult for Scotland to enforce 
unilaterally, and some may involve notification to the EU, which would be time 
consuming. He, therefore, recommended that the Parliament should endorse a single 
piece of UK legislation, which would take consideration of Scotland's legal system and 
confer some regulatory and order-making powers on Scottish ministers. As he pointed 
out: 
 
Advertising and promotional activities do not respect national boundaries. All 
UK Administrations have a common objective to effect a ban. It is vital to 
have a consistent approach throughout the UK if the ban is to be effective, 
robust in the face of any legal challenge and capable of effective enforcement. 
24
 
 
 Not all Sewel motions necessarily encroach on devolved matters. The Limited Liability 
Partnerships Act dealt mostly with a reserved matter - the regulation of business 
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associations, with the Sewel motion addressing the power to make regulations on the 
process of winding up a limited liability partnership (which is devolved). 
 There are some real objections to Sewel motions, in that they give Westminster control 
of the entire legislative process, allowing it to change the original understanding with 
Scotland.
25
  They may also give powers to Scottish ministers which are not subject to full 
scrutiny in the Scottish Parliament. There is, however, no evidence that Westminster is 
abusing the devolution settlement to impose policies on Scotland. Convergence is 
occurring, where it does, through policy imitation and learning rather than domination. 
 
Legislation that deals with the same issue but with a different policy 
There are eight pairs of Acts that address the same issue but which show significant 
differences in policy. As these are critical tests of policy divergence, and have proved 
politically important, we have analysed them individually.  
 The first two pairs of Acts respond to the demand for something to replace Section 
28/2A, which would ban the 'promotion' of homosexuality by local authorities in schools. 
Repeal in England was blocked by the House of Lords. This creates a policy divergence 
but not between the elected bodies in the two jurisdictions. In anticipation of repeal, both 
governments prepared legislation to assuage public concerns, and these show more subtle 
differences. The relevant clauses are in the Ethical Standards in Public Life etc. Scotland 
Act 2000 part VI / Local Government Act 2000 section 104, and the Standards in 
Scotland's Schools etc. Act 2000 section 56 / Learning and Skills Act 2000 section 148. 
The Scottish legislation places a new duty on councils to have regard to- 
 
a. the value of stable family life in a child's development; and 
b. the need to ensure the content of instruction provided in the performance of 
those functions is appropriate, having regard to each child's age, understanding 
and stage of development. 
 
It gives no explicit guidance on sex education. 
 
The Westminster legislation, however, stipulates that the Secretary of State must issue 
guidance designed to ensure that, in sex education, pupils should 
 
a. learn the nature of marriage and its importance for family life and the bringing 
up of children, and 
b.  (be) protected from teaching and materials which are inappropriate having 
regard to the age and religious and cultural background of the pupils 
concerned. 
 
Differences between these two pieces of legislation are subtle but show Holyrood as 
being rather more permissive and liberal, despite the strength of opposition to repeal of 
Section 28/2A.  
   Another politically salient issue was the decision of the Scottish Parliament, after Henry 
McLeish became First Minister, to implement the recommendation of the Sutherland 
report for free provision of nursing and personal care for the elderly in Scotland, which 
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the Westminster government declined to do. The relevant legislation can be found in the 
Community Care and Health (Scotland) Act 2002, which we compare with the 
Westminster Health and Social Care Act 2001 Part 4 (with Sewel motions). There is also 
a financial memorandum. This is a clear example of policy divergence, but there are also 
similarities between the two policies. Both Acts increase the provision of free nursing 
care.  The implementation of the Community Care and Health Act in Scotland results in 
the delivery of a 'free personal and nursing care ' payment of £210 per week.  Section 49 
of the Westminster Health and Social Care Act increases the provision of free nursing 
care in England and Wales by ensuring that nursing care in certain cases will be provided 
free of charge by the NHS. Separately from the free care debate, both acts allow for 
deferred payments of care home fees, with the balance payable on death from sale of 
assets: land or property.  
   Local government organisation is a matter traditionally handled separately in Scotland 
but we have only two rather minor examples - the Scottish Local Government (Elections) 
Act 2002 and the Local Government Act 2000 part IV.  Both deal with local elections, 
notably their timing.  But, while the Holyrood Act seeks to bring local elections into 
synchronisation with those for the Scottish Parliament, the Westminster Act gives the 
Secretary of State power to alter, by order, the frequency of elections and the years in 
which they are held, proposing three possible models.  The Holyrood Act makes 
provision for piloting innovative measures in local elections, especially those designed to 
improve turnout. Although the Westminster Act omits this, the Modern Local 
Government White Paper did contain similar proposals for England and Wales. 
   Water supply matters were also handled separately before devolution, since Scotland's 
water boards remained public after the sale of water companies in England and Wales. 
Parts of the Water Industry (Scotland) Bill 2002 and the Water Industry Act 1999 suggest 
some degree of convergence around a ‘new public management’ model of service 
delivery. Scottish Water is to be given greater commercial freedom, restricted as long as 
its three predecessors remained purely public bodies, while the 1999 Act restricts the 
abilities of commercial water companies in England and Wales to cut off the water supply 
following non-payment of charges. 
   Leasehold reform has long been a preoccupation for Labour governments, but the legal 
provisions in Scotland differ from those in the rest of the UK to such a degree that the 
legislation must be quite distinct. So we find in the Leasehold Casualties (Scotland) Act 
2001 and the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002.  These Acts refer to the 
same broad issue, but are necessarily different in approach because the rules in Scotland 
were already different.  However, the 2002 Act is also more extensive - it addresses major 
reforms, whilst the Scottish Act is a relatively modest Members' Act to address 
compensation for leaseholders. The Scottish Act provides for the extinction of leasehold 
casualties; for the payment of compensation on their extinction; for irritancy provisions in 
certain leases of land to be void; for the misapplication, in relation to certain leases and 
the rule of law entitling a landlord in certain circumstances to terminate a lease.  The 
Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act addresses the problems of leaseholding 
properties (such as flats) which are interdependent.  The commonhold is introduced to 
give tenants the security of a freehold (which is as close as possible to outright 
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ownership) combined with the potential to improve covenants (tying tenants to certain 
rules of behaviour concerning the upkeep of their property) related to leaseholds.  
   Marriage is another civil law matter traditionally handled separately in Scotland. The 
Marriage (Scotland) Act 2002, amends the 1977 Marriage (Scotland) Act to permit civil 
marriages (since there are no restrictions on religious ceremonies in Scotland) to be 
solemnised in places approved for the purpose by local authorities or Scottish Ministers.  
While there is no equivalent legislation in Westminster, the White Paper Civil 
Registration: Vital Change of January 2002 signals the government's intention to 
introduce similar legislation (although in England and Wales there are less restrictions on 
civil and more on religious ceremonies). 
   In transport, differences have emerged which are at the borderline between differences 
in policy and differences in application – see, for example, the case of the Transport 
(Scotland) Act 2001 / Transport Act 2000 parts II and III. In the pre-devolution White 
Papers
26
 preceding these Acts the overall thrust of policy was the same, but with 
differences reflecting conditions in the two jurisdictions. In England the key problem is 
identified as rising car use and the associated problems for the environment, and road 
traffic. In Scotland, the key issues are Scotland's unique geography, population spread and 
peripheral position (the last being a trade-related issue).  The DETR White Paper 
emphasises the value of public-private partnerships, while in the Scottish White Paper the 
emphasis is more on partnership and co-operation between public bodies, especially local 
authorities. The Scottish White Paper takes integration of transport into other policy areas 
further than its DETR counterpart.  Integration with environmental concerns is 
understood also to include issues related to heritage, rather than just meeting 
commitments for reduced CO2 emissions. Integration with education includes the role 
schools can play in encouraging better transport practices.  
   Even after devolution, Finance Minister Andy Kerr told the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution that the English long-term transport strategy (since largely 
abandoned) was a relevant framework for Scotland.
27
  This is evident from the 
subsequent legislation. Both Acts introduce integrated transport strategies in their 
respective territories. The scope of the Westminster Act is wider, including the reserved 
matters of air traffic and railways. Otherwise, large sections of the text are the same, with 
variations reflecting only minor territorial differences in institutional arrangements. A 
difference reflecting the scope of application is that the Westminster Act places a 
statutory obligation on local transport authorities to set out local transport and bus 
strategies.  Although they are encouraged to develop and have reference to a coherent 
transport strategy, no similar statutory obligation is placed on Scottish local authorities. A 
more substantive difference concerns a shift between the Scottish White Paper and the 
Act with the disappearance of provision for workplace parking levies and trunk road tolls, 
although these remain in the Westminster Act. This followed ferocious lobbying of 
Scottish ministers by the CBI and other business interests.  This shows how a policy, 
which started off in the pre-devolution system, was amenable to change in the new 
Scottish dispensation. 
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Legislation that deals with the same issue and with the same policy, but with scope 
for differences in application 
Beyond these examples of divergence, the analysis becomes more difficult. The 
remaining legislation often shows differences in the organisational form of policy, of the 
sort that existed before devolution. There is also some scope for ministers to implement 
policy rather differently on both sides of the border. Matters of organisational form and 
administrative discretion fade into differences of policy, making it difficult to draw clear 
lines.  
   Freedom of information is such a borderline issue. It was a salient question in both 
parliaments and the Scottish Liberal Democrats have made much of the more liberal 
provision secured by Jim Wallace in the Scottish Act. The basis for both the Freedom of 
Information (Scotland)2002 Act and the Freedom of Information Act 2000 was the White 
Paper Your Right to Know (Cm 3818), of December 1997, although the Scottish 
Executive also published its own consultation document An Open Scotland in November 
1999.  The wording is slightly different, but the explanatory notes for each Act suggest 
that these are the same in most part.  The Westminster Act stipulates that it does not apply 
to the Scottish Parliament or Executive or to Scottish devolved bodies (though it does 
apply in Wales and Northern Ireland). Each act supersedes the existing non-statutory 
codes of practice on access to governmental information by creating statutory rights of 
access to a wider range of public authorities (government and Parliament, local 
government, NHS, educational institutions, the police and other public bodies and 
offices).  The acts cover a general right of access to information held by public 
authorities, exemptions, the creation of information commissioners, enforcement and a 
discussion of historical documents.  However, the Westminster act also amends the 
appeals process to the information tribunal dealing with data protection, which is a 
reserved matter. Both bills were more restrictive than the Labour Party had suggested in 
opposition, and were further amended during their passage.  The Scottish Act is 
somewhat less restrictive than the UK one, although less so than in its original version. In 
the Westminster Act, a series of clauses exempts items whose disclosure would prejudice 
various matters; in the Scottish Act this becomes ‘seriously prejudice’.  In both Acts there 
is provision for ministers to disregard notices of failure to enforce if they issue a 
certificate that enforcement has indeed occurred.  Otherwise, in the original versions, only 
the UK Act gave ministers the last word. A ministerial amendment to the Scottish Act, 
however, gave a minister the right to disregard the notice if the matter is ‘of exceptional 
sensitivity’. The amendment in turn had been modified in the Parliament to insist on the 
‘exceptional sensitivity’ condition.  These differences are subtle but suggest that in 
practice the Scottish legislation may be rather more liberal than its UK counterpart. 
   The next set of examples concerns the regulation of public services, according to New 
Labour philosophy but tailored to the situation in England and Scotland. Policies on 
access and accountability in the public services have the same aim, but Scotland's 
circumstances allow its policy to appear more coherent. The Scottish Public Sector 
Ombudsman Bill 2002 creates one independent ombudsman to be responsible for 
monitoring all of the listed public services (NHS, local government, housing, mental 
welfare, enterprise).   There is no Westminster legislative equivalent but we compare it 
with the 1999 White Paper Modernising Government, which introduces a series of 
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specific initiatives such as  'Learning Labs' and 'Regulatory Impact Assessments’, and 
lists a series of aims such as NHS Direct being continuously available by 2000 with 'all 
dealings with Government being deliverable electronically by 2008'. 
   Education provides several examples of detailed divergence, for example in the paired 
Acts, Standards in Scotland's Schools etc. Act 2000 sections 26-31 and the Education Act 
2002 Ch 1 of Part 3. Much of the Scottish Act mirrors English trends but with differences 
of emphasis. Scotland abolishes opting out of local authority control, in line with the 
general tendency of the Scottish executive to retain the public model of service delivery.
28
 
Both Acts deal with school governing boards, but the emphasis in England and Wales is 
stronger, giving greater devolved powers to governing bodies in maintained schools.   
   The Scottish Act: 'puts education authorities under a statutory duty to look beyond 
general provision to the development of the individual child.  Authorities will also be 
required in carrying out their duty under this provision to take account of the child's views 
when making decisions that would significantly affect them' (para. 6, Explanatory Notes) 
This increased emphasis on the rights of the individual appears to be in line with trends 
south of the border. Similarly, the Act's focus on priorities (literacy, numeracy etc.), 
targets and the measuring of performance seem to mirror developments in this direction at 
Westminster. However, these are to be determined the Scottish way, via consultation and 
with parliamentary scrutiny and approval. Section 5 deals with the 'Education Authority's 
annual statement of improvement objectives', hinting at the type of centralisation and 
corporate plan-making more readily associated with education south of the border. 
Parallels with English trends may also be discerned in the Act's provision relating to 
school development plans, reviews of school performance (which must be published), 
inspections of education authorities, empowerment of Scottish ministers to issue statutory 
guidance to education authorities in relation to raising standards and delegation schemes. 
The abolition of corporal punishment follows the England and Wales example (in the 
School Standards and Framework Act 1998). 
 Similarly, the Standards in Scotland's Schools etc. Act 2000 and section 32/ Education 
Act 2002 part 9 both address the adequate provision for pre-school education.  However, 
the Scottish policy is more concrete and extensive.  Whilst the 2002 Act - which amends 
the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 - requires that LEAs ensure an adequate 
level of pre-school provision, the Scottish Act also contains provision for local councils 
to contract this provision out to private nurseries (or at least reimburse parents for a 
proportion of their private nursery fees). 
   Another example of different application concerns fuel poverty.  The Warm Homes and 
Energy Conservation Act 2000 requires UK ministers to publish and implement a strategy 
for reducing fuel poverty (with set targets). This has a Scottish parallel in the ‘Central 
Heating Programme and Warm Deal’ policy which states that, ‘By 2006 no local 
authority or housing association tenant or anyone aged 60 or over will have to live in a 
home that does not have central heating or adequate insulation.’29  However, during 
passage of the Housing Bill, the Scottish Executive rejected amendments to make this a 
statutory requirement. 
   Examinations are also a matter traditionally organised separately in Scotland. The 
Scottish Qualifications Authority Act, 2002 amends the Education (Scotland) Act 1996 to 
respond to the summer exams crisis of 2002 and tends to converge on the English 
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Education Act, 1997, Section 21.  The Act maintains the board as an Executive NDPB, 
but reduces its membership from 16-25 to 8-10 including a chair and a chief executive. 
The membership will be chosen by Scottish Ministers.  The SQA will focus on 
management issues, whilst a new Advisory Body filled by stakeholders will offer advice 
on qualification issues.  This brings the SQA closer to the English Qualifications and 
Curriculum Authority set up in 1997 which has 8-13 members, all selected by the 
Secretary of State for Education and Skills. 
 The regulation of care standards was promised in the pre-devolution White Papers 
Aiming for Excellence: Modernising Social Work Services in Scotland (March 1999) and 
Modernising Social Services (DoH, November 1998). Already there were subtle 
differences, notably in the treatment of local government.  Modernising Social Services 
betrayed a greater distrust of local authorities and a wish to place stricter controls on 
them. While it suggested that there is currently a conflict of interests in local authorities' 
roles, the Scottish Aiming for Excellence White Paper only mentioned the potential for a 
conflict of interests, and the suggestion that local authorities might shirk their 
responsibilities featured in England but not in Scotland.  The DoH White Paper further 
proposed that payments under the Children's Services Grant be made dependent on the 
preparation and achievement by local authorities of action plans. The two White Papers 
gave rise to the Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act 2001 and the Care Standards Act 2000 
(which includes a Sewel motion). Both seek to raise social services standards by 
registering the workforce, establishing new codes of conduct for workers and enhancing 
professional and training standards, as well as registering organisations and subjecting 
them to independent scrutiny. They establish bodies with responsibilities in the two key 
areas of workforce (the Scottish Social Services Council in Scotland and the General 
Social Care Council in England), and organisational standards (the Scottish Commission 
for the Regulation of Care in Scotland and the National Care Standards Commission in 
England). There are, however, some minor differences:  
 
 coverage of the Holyrood Act is broader and includes secure accommodation 
services, adult placement services, child minding, day care of children and 
housing support services; 
 there are some small differences in the responsibilities of the key institutions, 
the Scottish Commission for the Regulation of Care,  Her Majesty's Inspectors 
of Schools, the National Commission for Care Standards, the Scottish Social 
Services Council and  the Training Organisation for Personal Social Services 
(TOPSS) in England; 
 there is provision in the Westminster Act for the Care Standards Commission in 
England to develop a regional structure. Indeed the Modernising Social Services 
White Paper proposed not the establishment of a National Care Standards 
Commission, but of 8 regional Commissions; 
 
   The Protection of Children Act (1999) requires a list to be kept (by the Secretary of 
State) of persons considered to be unsuitable to work with children. Such a list was 
suggested in the White Paper Aiming For Excellence: Modernising Social Work Services 
in Scotland (March 1999). The Scottish Commission for the Regulation of Care that was, 
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in the White Paper's vision, to be responsible for the list, was subsequently established in 
The Regulation of Care (Scotland) Act 2001. The list itself was only established by the 
Protection of Children (Scotland) Act 2003.  The Scottish Act contains two significant 
differences.  First, the Scottish Executive argued that appeals to the Sheriff Court offered 
greater protection and less reliance on employer cooperation than the tribunal process 
established in England and Wales. Second, there is explicit discussion in the Scottish Act 
on procedures to constrain malicious claims (following an amendment to address the 
concerns of Michael Russell MSP). 
 There are similarly detailed but important differences on the question of ethical 
standards in public bodies, responding to the July 1997 report of the Nolan Committee 
Standards of Conduct in Local Government in England, Scotland and Wales. The Ethical 
Standards in Public Life etc. (Scotland) Act 2000 and the Local Government Act 2000 
both seek to introduce a new ethical framework for local government, and link their 
provision to democracy and the 'bond of trust' between bodies and the public. The 
measures are broadly similar: the introduction of codes of conduct; registers of interests; 
and clearer independent powers of investigation and adjudication in cases of alleged 
impropriety. The details of the Acts, however, reveal some important differences in 
coverage and operation. The coverage of the Holyrood Act is broader, covering all 
devolved bodies and the code of conduct for councillors (though not for other bodies) is 
set at national level. In England there is a separation of functions between the local 
Standards Committees, the Standards Board for England (with a regional structure), and 
an Adjudication Panel to supply the staff for Tribunals. These functions are combined in 
the Standards Board for Scotland.  
   Increased public rights of access to the countryside for recreational use, subject to 
measures to address conservation, the privacy of individuals and the operational needs of 
land managers, was promised by Labour before the 1997 election and was realised in the 
Land Reform (Scotland) Bill Part 1 and the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000. The 
Westminster Act has a greater focus on traffic issues, wildlife enforcement and Areas of 
Outstanding Natural Beauty.  Its provisions on protecting Sites of Special Scientific 
Interest also apply to Scotland. 
   Housing is a policy field in which there is a long tradition of separate Scottish 
legislation, a legacy of distinct institutional arrangements, but also a lot of policy 
diffusion and mutual learning. This has continued, as we can see from the Housing 
(Scotland) Act, 2001 and the Homelessness Act, 2002 which both deal with the issue of 
homelessness in line with Labour policy but in slightly different ways. The Scottish Act 
also provides for the replacement of Scottish Homes with a new Executive Agency, 
Communities Scotland. Following the English and Welsh legislation, Scotland then got a 
dedicated Act on homelessness, the Homelessness (Scotland) Act, 2003. 
   Finally, the example of commissioners for young people demonstrates a policy 
convergence fostered by committees of devolved parliaments.  The Children's 
Commissioner For Wales Act 2001 emerged from an Assembly committee.  It establishes 
a commissioner to promote the rights and welfare of young people, and particularly 
relates to the statutory organizations defined by section 5 of the Care Standards Act 2000.  
The Education, Culture and Sport Committee sponsored bill Commissioner for Children 
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and Young People (Scotland) Act 2003 includes similar provisions to investigate statutory 
services but also provides for a publicity role to highlight children’s rights issues. 
 
Legislation that is essentially the same but passed separately 
Security matters show a large degree of policy similarity, given the common security area 
and the desire to avoid legal loopholes, despite the devolution of most of the criminal 
law. So we find a number of Acts that are essentially reproduced separately at 
Westminster and Holyrood. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 
and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 part II (with two Sewel motions)
30
 
are identical in large part. Both regulate surveillance and the use of covert intelligence 
sources.  There are some minor differences reflecting the different configurations of 
institutions and functions north and south of the border. Jim Wallace argued, 'We have 
been keen to ensure that there are no gaps between the two regimes that could be 
exploited by those responsible for serious crime, because there is blurred responsibility 
when the bills require police and law enforcement agency cooperation within Britain.'
31
    
   The International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001 and the International Criminal 
Court Act 2001 (with a Sewel motion) both give effect to the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court; provide for offences under the laws of the territories they cover 
corresponding to offences within the jurisdiction of the Court; enable assistance to be 
provided to the Court in relation to investigations and prosecutions; make provision in 
relation to the enforcement of sentences and orders of the Court; and deal with connected 
purposes. Jim Wallace argued that since the competence of the Scottish Parliament to 
legislate on this matter is open to interpretation, the Sewel motion removes doubt by 
asking Westminster to legislate on the areas with blurred distinctions of responsibility.  
This relates to privileges and immunities, arrest and surrender and the movement of 
prisoners.
32
  
   Another pair of Acts that deal with matters at the intersection of devolved and reserved 
matters are the Education and Training (Scotland) Act 2000 / Learning and Skills Act 
2000, and they also have financial implications (sections 104 and 105). The Explanatory 
Note accompanying the Holyrood Act states that: 'Section 104 of the Learning and Skills 
Act, which extends to Scotland, provides the Secretary of State with power to specify 
conditions to be satisfied in order for accounts based on a tied financial product to qualify 
for the payment of grants.  This has been dealt with in the Learning and Skills Act 
because it relates to the reserved matter of financial instruments.  However, powers under 
section 104 are to be exercisable in, or as regards Scotland, by the Scottish Ministers, 
subject to the control of the Scottish Parliament'. While the legal provision is the same 
this gives rather wide scope for administrative variation, analogous to the administrative 
devolution common in economic and labour market matters. So the different education 
and qualifications frameworks in Scotland suggest that what is funded may be quite 
different in practice. 
 A minor matter but potentially sensitive issue is dealt with separately in the Census 
(Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2000 and the Census (Amendment) Act 2000. Both enable 
particulars in respect of religion to be gathered. Scottish ministers had not originally 
planned such a question, but the Equal Opportunities Commission asked them to do so. 
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Since there was widespread support for this in the Scottish Parliament and the relevant 
committee, the Scottish Executive gave way and converged with England.
33
  
   The Fur Farming (Prohibition) (Scotland) Act 2002 closes a possible loophole in 
Scotland opened by the Fur Farming (Prohibition) Act 2000. Fur farming is being banned 
in England, and the Scottish legislation ensures that the firms based in England and 
Wales do not just relocate to Scotland.  The wording is virtually identical in each Act, 
with the only difference relating to appeals - to the Crown court in England or Wales and 
to the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland. 
 
Conclusion 
Legislation is, of course, only one measure of policy divergence and further opportunities 
for both divergence and convergence arise in its application. Yet we can identify some 
patterns after four years of devolution. There is a Scottish sphere of legislation on matters 
not affecting the rest of the United Kingdom, which is considerably larger than before and 
which does not stem from broader UK initiatives. On the other hand, there is a lot of 
legislation which is rather similar and shows signs of common origins and principles.  
   On matters of common interest, there is a large degree of consistency between the 
Labour-led administrations on both sides of the border but there are differences of style 
and emphasis. We are also struck by the way in which it is often England that diverges 
from old policy lines while Scotland chooses not to. This reflects the continued social 
democratic (or Old Labour as it is rather pejoratively termed) tradition in Scotland as 
well, perhaps, as the more consultative and consensual policy style, which makes radical 
policy change more difficult in the short term. Scotland has retained more of the 
traditional public service model of provision and given a larger role to local government, 
whether one portrays this, as do some critics
34
 as pandering to 'producer interests' in the 
public service unions, or as a defence of traditional social democracy.  There is also less 
stress in Scotland on ‘targetry’, the setting of quantitative targets for policy performance. 
These differences, albeit matters of degree, go beyond the differences of form visible 
before devolution.  
   Coalition government in Scotland has also made a difference. The Freedom of 
Information legislation is a bit more liberal. There has also been less emphasis on hard-
line law and order policies, again due to the presence of a Liberal Democrat at the Justice 
Department. The Criminal Justice Bill for England and Wales introduced in 2002 and 
which as yet has not counterpart in Scotland provides for curtailment of jury trials; 
prosecution appeals against judges’ dismissal of charges; disclosure of evidence of bad 
character against the accused; the use of some hearsay evidence; and the possibility of 
retrial of certain cases and after an acquittal (ending the ban on double jeopardy).  The 
division between the coalition partners in this field was evident during the election 
campaign of 2003 and Labour’s insistence on tougher law and order policies was an issue 
in the subsequent coalition negotiations in which Labour insisted on new measures and 
took the Justice portfolio into its own hands.  
   There is also evidence of common policies turning out differently as a result of differing 
pressures in the two jurisdictions, as we saw in the Transport Acts. Other divergences, 
such as the details of access to the countryside, marriage or leasehold reform, represent 
adaptations to Scotland's legal system and could have been expected before devolution.  
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   Our analysis also confirms the strong social and contextual pressures to uniformity. The 
common security area leads to a desire for uniformity on matters of law enforcement and 
regulation, even while permitting important differences in criminal procedure and rights. 
Interest group demands also make it difficult to sustain very different levels of social 
provision on either side of the border. Although we have seen two clear examples in long-
term care for the elderly and university fees, these have given rise to demands for parity, 
with some visible response. The role of the civil service as a unifying force, together with 
the limited policy capacity of the Scottish Executive, is seen in the tendency to imitative 
legislation over many fields. There is, however, some scope for initiatives from the 
devolved assemblies rather than executives and for diffusion around the periphery rather 
than just from the centre. Both are illustrated by the Commissioner for Children and 
Young People Act.  
   Devolution represents an evolutionary process rather than a revolutionary break, with 
the Scottish Parliament staking out new fields for policy innovation beyond what was 
available to the old Scottish Office. We have seen evidence of change on both dimensions 
identified earlier. Scotland does have the ability to go its own way within its devolved 
sphere, and diverge from law south of the border. There is also some evidence of shift 
within Scotland, with issues like land reform gaining more prominence.  Interest group 
activity has increased in Scotland
35
 and this can be credited with changes in legislation 
from White Papers to Acts, although tracing this would require case studies of the 
passage of individual bills. Some of these measures originated before devolution but were 
moulded in the Scottish Parliament. The supply of common initiatives will be less in the 
second Parliament and we may see more divergence again. Where there is a will to make 
distinct policy, Scotland is able to do so, but the traces of the previous system of unitary 
government are still highly visible.  
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